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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Humberto Mejia, Jr., appeals from the district court’s order denying appointed-
counsel and summarily dismissing his June petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On January 23, 2014, officers from the Nampa Police Department were called in 
to intervene in a domestic disturbance.  (PSI, p.3.)  By the time officers arrived on 
scene, Mejia had kicked in the locked front door of an apartment, broken into the locked 
master bedroom, and was attempting to kick in the locked master bathroom door, 
behind which were huddled two women and three children.  (Id.)  One of the women 
was Mejia’s former live-in girlfriend, who was attempting to leave him after he strangled 
and beat her.  (Id.)  Police arrested Mejia.  (Id., pp.3-4.) 
The state charged Mejia with attempted strangulation and domestic battery in the 
presence of children.  (R., pp.43-44.)  Mejia entered into a plea agreement with the 
state, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to the domestic battery charge and the state 
dismissed the strangulation and various misdemeanor charges.  (R., pp.48, 66.)  On 
April 15, 2015, the district court entered judgment against Mejia and sentenced him to 
six years with three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.52-54.)  Mejia refused 
to cooperate and complete the intake process for his rider program, and so the 
evaluator recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction on April 21.  (R., 
pp.61, 67, n.2.)  On May 4, 2015, the district court acted on that recommendation and 
relinquished jurisdiction.  (R., pp.55, 66-67.)  Several months later, on November 6, 
2015, Mejia filed a pro se Rule 35 motion, requesting a reduction of his sentence.  (R., 
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pp.57-59.)  The district court denied the motion on the basis that it was untimely.  (R., 
pp.60-62.)  Mejia appealed and, on April 13, 2016, this Court entered an order 
dismissing his appeal as untimely.  (R., p.67.)   
Contemporaneous with the filing of his Rule 35 motion, it appears that Mejia 
attempted to file a petition for post-conviction relief.  (See R., pp.18-24.)  However, due 
to a miscommunication or mishandling of his paperwork (see R., pp.11-17, 25-27), 
Mejia’s petition was not presented to the district court until much later.  On June 21, 
2016 (or June 15 under the mailbox rule), Mejia filed a second petition for post-
conviction relief.  (R., pp.3-10.)  The district court dismissed the claims contained in this 
June petition on the grounds that they were untimely, disproved by the record, and/or 
ambiguous and unsupported by admissible evidence.  (R., pp.66-71, 292.)  Mejia filed, 
essentially, a motion for reconsideration (R., pp.95-119), which the district court did not 
consider.  Mejia also filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.73-75.) 
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ISSUES 
Mejia states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Mejia’s 
post-conviction petition without providing Mr. Mejia the notice or 
opportunity to respond required by I.C. § 19-4906(b)? 
 
2. Whether the district court erred by summarily dismissing several of 
Mr. Mejia’s claims for relief based on information from hearings held in the 
underlying criminal case, as it had not, nor could it have, taken proper 
judicial notice of that information. 
 
3. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed 
several of Mr. Mejia’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as 
untimely even though his petition was timely from the judgment of 
conviction under proper application of the prison mailbox rule. 
 
4. Whether the district court erred when it denied Mr. Mejia’s motion 
for appointment of counsel because he alleged the possibility of a valid 
claim. 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) 
 
The state consolidates and rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. The notice issues notwithstanding, has Mejia failed to show that the district court 
committed reversible error when it summarily dismissed his untimely June petition for 
post-conviction relief? 
 
2. Has Mejia failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion for appointed counsel to pursue his frivolous post-conviction 
petitions? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Mejia Has Failed To Show That The District Court Committed Reversible Error When It 
Summarily Dismissed His Untimely June Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
 
A. Introduction 
The state does not dispute that remand is necessary in this case.  The state only 
disputes the scope of that remand.  Below, Mejia filed petitions for post-conviction relief 
in November and June, respectively.  (See R., pp.3-10, 18-24.)  The district court never 
addressed Mejia’s November petition and, as explained below, though the state does 
not believe any of Mejia’s claims in that petition are meritorious, this case should be 
remanded for the district court to consider and rule upon that petition.   
In Mejia’s June petition, he claimed that the district court had taken his guilty plea 
without informing him of the maximum potential sentence for his crime; that the court 
sentenced him without giving him an opportunity to allocute; and that his attorney was 
ineffective both for failing “to discover or raise issues” and in relation to his Rule 35 
motion.  (R., pp.5, 9.)  The district court addressed and summarily dismissed Mejia’s 
June petition.  (R., pp.66-71.)  The state concedes that the district court committed 
procedural errors when dismissing this petition; however, these errors were harmless.  
Ultimately, Mejia has failed to show reversible error in the district court’s summary 
dismissal of his June petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file 
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….”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). 
 
C. The District Court Failed To Give Adequate Notice Under Idaho Code § 19-
4906(B) Of Its Intent To Dismiss Mejia’s Petition 
 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-4901, et seq.  A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).  Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief.  Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008).  However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the “application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1).”  Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)).  
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that “specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.”  State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief on the trial court’s own initiative or in response to a party’s motion.  
Under subsection (b), 
6 
[w]hen a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the 
answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-
conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further 
proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the 
application and its reasons for so doing.  The applicant shall be given an 
opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal.  In light of 
the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the application 
dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, [sic] direct that 
the proceedings otherwise continue.  Disposition on the pleadings and 
record is not proper if there exists a material issue of fact. 
 
I.C. § 19-4906(b); see also Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803.  On the other 
hand, where the district court grants a party’s motion for summary dismissal under 
subsection (c), there is no 20-day notice requirement because the motion itself serves 
as the notice.  Workman, 144 Idaho 518, 524, 164 P.3d 798, 804 (citing Saykhamchone 
v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995)).   
On appeal, Mejia claims that he lacked the statutorily required 20-day notice of 
the district court’s intent to dismiss.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.9-11.)  The district court 
indicated that it was granting the state’s motion for summary dismissal, not dismissing 
Mejia’s June petition on its own motion.  (R., pp.67, 71.)  Had the court granted a motion 
for summary dismissal, there would be no notice requirement.  However, while the state 
filed an answer to Mejia’s petition, which raised affirmative defenses and requested that 
Mejia’s “claims for Post-Conviction Relief be denied and/or dismissed” (R., p.41), the 
state agrees with Mejia on appeal that the state does not appear to have filed a motion 
for summary dismissal below. 
Because the state did not file a motion for summary dismissal, there was no 
motion before the district court that it could grant, and the court’s order summarily 
dismissing Mejia’s petition was necessarily on its own motion.  Because the district 
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court summarily dismissed Mejia’s petition on its own motion, it was statutorily required 
to give Mejia 20 days to respond to the proposed dismissal.  It failed to do this.  “Failure 
to provide such notice and opportunity to be heard may result in reversal of a summary 
dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief.”  Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 
227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010) (citing Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 321, 900 P.2d at 797).  
However, a lack of notice does not require reversal.  Id. 
The district court’s failure to give adequate notice affects every subsequent issue 
in this case.  But the purpose of giving notice is to allow the petitioner the opportunity to 
address and cure defects in his pleadings.  See Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 323, 900 
P.2d at 799.  This Court “employs the same standards on appellate review that the trial 
court applies in considering summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief.”  
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930.  Where the petition would ultimately be 
subject to summarily dismissal regardless of the adequacy of notice, because the 
defects in the pleadings are not curable or otherwise, the failure to give notice is 
harmless error.  As shown below, under the facts of this case, the district court’s failure 
to give notice was harmless. 
 
D. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Most Of Mejia’s Post-Conviction Claims 
Because They Were Untimely 
 
One of the bases given by the district court for dismissing most of Mejia’s June 
post-conviction claims was that they were untimely.  (R., p.71.)  Post-conviction 
proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.  I.C. § 19-
4901, et seq.  Under Idaho Code § 19-4902(a), to be timely, a post-conviction 
proceeding must be commenced by filing a petition “any time within one (1) year from 
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the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later.”  The district court 
entered judgment against Mejia on April 15, 2015.  (R., p.66.)  Mejia did not file a notice 
of appeal timely from the judgment, and he was therefore required to file his post-
conviction petition by May 27, 2016.  Mejia filed the present petition for post-conviction 
relief on June 21, 2016, or (as the district court noted) on June 15, 2016, under the 
mailbox rule.  (R., pp.3, 6, 67.)  Because Mejia’s petition was not filed within the statute 
of limitation, the claims challenging his underlying conviction—including Mejia’s claims 
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to discover and raise issues; that he entered 
his guilty plea without being informed of the maximum possible sentence; and that the 
court sentenced him without giving him an opportunity to speak—were untimely and 
correctly dismissed. 
Of course, under certain circumstances, the statute of limitations may be tolled.  
Because a party may show that her or she is entitled to equitable tolling to rebut the 
affirmative defense that his or her petition was untimely filed, this generally would 
constitute grounds which are curable and for which notice is needed.  However, in this 
case, Mejia appears to have anticipated the timeliness bar to his action and made his 
equitable tolling argument in his filings below, asserting that he had timely filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief, but failed to get it before the district court to be ruled 
upon.  (See R., pp.25-27.)  Mejia was not entitled to equitable tolling on this basis. 
“[T]he bar for equitable tolling for post-conviction actions is high.”  Chico-
Rodriquez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582, 114 P.3d 137, 140 (Ct. App. 2005).  “Equitable 
tolling for post-conviction actions ‘is borne of the petitioner’s due process right to have a 
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meaningful opportunity to present his or her claims.’”  Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 
385-86, 256 P.3d 791, 793-94 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Leer v. State, 148 Idaho 112, 
115, 218 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Ct. App. 2009)).  Idaho appellate courts have allowed for 
equitable tolling in circumstances where the petitioner is incarcerated out-of-state 
without access to representation or Idaho legal materials; where his mental illness or 
medications render him incompetent and prevent him from timely challenging his 
conviction; or where the petitioner’s claim is based on newly discovered evidence.  Judd 
v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25-26, 218 P.3d 1, 4-5 (Ct. App. 2009).  Courts, however, “have 
not permitted equitable tolling where the post-conviction petitioner’s own lack of 
diligence caused or contributed to the untimeliness of the petition.”  Amboh v. State, 149 
Idaho 650, 653, 239 P.3d 448, 451 (Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted). 
There is no argument that Mejia was housed out-of-state without access to Idaho 
legal materials; he is not on medications which render him incompetent and unable to 
file a timely petition; his petition for post-conviction relief was not based on newly 
discovered evidence.  Mejia was not prevented from filing a timely petition for post-
conviction relief.  Rather, his untimely filing was caused, or at least contributed to, by his 
own lack of diligence in getting his petition before the district court.  His untimely petition 
for post-conviction relief was therefore not entitled to equitable tolling, and the district 
court could correctly dismiss the petition on these grounds.   
On appeal, instead of asserting that he was entitled to equitable tolling, Mejia 
instead argues that his petition was actually timely filed.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-19.)  
The state agrees that the information Mejia provided is sufficient to present at least a 
prima facie case that he in fact timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief—
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specifically, the November petition.  Contrary to Mejia’s arguments, however, the timely 
filing of that petition does not save Mejia’s claims attacking his underlying conviction 
made in his untimely June petition.  None of these claims was raised in Mejia’s 
November petition.  (Compare R., pp.4-9 with pp.18-24 (essentially requesting 
reconsideration of the order relinquishing jurisdiction).)  The claims from the later (and 
untimely) filed June petition, therefore, would not relate back to the timely filed 
November petition.  See Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 
(Ct. App. 1999).  
The claims from Mejia’s June post-conviction petition that attacked his underlying 
conviction were untimely and the district court correctly dismissed those claims on this 
ground.  Though the district court erred by not giving Mejia the statutorily required 20-
day notice, this error is harmless because Mejia appears to have already addressed any 
potential for equitable tolling and failed to show that he is entitled to it.  “[T]he court must 
disregard all error and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.”  I.R.C.P. 
61.  Mejia simply was not diligent in timely presenting these specific claims to the district 
court, and the dismissal of these claims therefore did not affect his substantial rights.  
The district court’s order summarily dismissing the untimely claims from Mejia’s June 
petition should be affirmed.   
The November petition, however, was timely filed.  This petition does not appear 
to have been acknowledged, much less ruled upon, by the district court.  Though the 
state does not believe any of the claims raised in the November petition are meritorious 
(or appropriately brought in post-conviction), the case may still be remanded to the 
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district court for consideration of the timely-filed, though still frivolous, claims from the 
November petition. 
 
E. In The Alternative, Mejia’s Post-Conviction Claims Are Either Disproved By The 
Record Or Unsupported By The Law And Evidence, And Therefore Could Be 
Correctly Dismissed 
 
If this Court determines that the district court’s failure to give adequate notice of 
its intent to dismiss Mejia’s petition for failure to timely file is not harmless 
(notwithstanding Mejia’s preemptory argument in support of tolling), or if this Court 
determines that Mejia was entitled to equitable tolling, or that his petition was otherwise 
timely-filed, his post-conviction claims from the June petition should still be dismissed 
because they are either unsupported by any evidence or disproved by the record. 
“To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present 
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which 
the applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 
278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  
Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal “if the applicant’s 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each element of the petitioner’s 
claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.  While a court must accept a petitioner’s 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant’s 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s 
conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).  The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
12 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief.  Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  “Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
 
1. Mejia’s Claims That He Pleaded Guilty Without Knowing The Maximum 
Potential Sentence For His Crime Or That The District Court Sentenced 
Him Without Giving Him The Opportunity To Speak On His Own Behalf 
Are Affirmatively Disproved By The Record 
 
As noted above, in his June petition Mejia claimed that he pleaded guilty without 
being advised of the maximum possible sentence for domestic battery and that he was 
not allowed to speak in his own behalf before the district court sentenced him.  (R., 
pp.5, 9.)  As shown by the district court, both of these claims are affirmatively disproved 
by the record.  (R., p.70.)  Contrary to Mejia’s assertions, the district court informed him 
both of the maximum possible sentence and that it did not have to follow the parties’ 
recommendations before Mejia entered his guilty plea.  (Id.; see also Aug. 2/20/2015 
Hrg. at 3:41 – 4:07.)  Furthermore, before sentencing, Mejia was offered (and availed 
himself of) the opportunity to speak on his own behalf.  (R., p.70; see also Aug. 
4/13/2015 Hrg. at 11:14 – 13:16.)1 
Mejia argues on appeal that the district court improperly took judicial notice of the 
hearings which disprove his post-conviction claims.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-15.)  Mejia 
is correct.  Under Idaho Rule of Evidence 201, when taking judicial notice of records, 
                                            
1  This claim would also fail as a matter of law.  While there may be a procedural right to 
allocution, I.C.R. 33(1)(a), there is no constitutional right to allocution, see Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962); State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88, 303 P.3d 
241, 246-47 (Ct. App. 2013).  Even had the district court not permitted Mejia to speak 
on his own behalf, that would not have deprived Mejia of a constitutional right. 
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exhibits, or transcripts from the same or a separate case, a court is supposed to identify 
the documents noticed.  I.R.E. 201(c).  The district court did not identify the documents 
upon which it relied.  Moreover, as Mejia notes on appeal and the state agrees, it 
appears that no official transcripts of the hearings have been produced upon which the 
district court could have relied.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14, n.6.)  While “[a] judge may 
take judicial notice of personal recollection of prior proceedings to the extent that the 
judge recalls what occurred,” those “previous hearing[s] must be transcribed so that any 
alleged error in such judicial notice is subject to appellate review.”  Navarro v. Yonkers, 
144 Idaho 882, 887, 173 P.3d 1141, 1146 (2007) (citing State v. Nunez, 138 Idaho 636, 
643, 67 P.3d 831, 838 (2003); Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215, 
1222 (1992)).   
The district court’s failure to properly notice the hearings by identifying them and 
having them transcribed, however, is harmless in this case because this Court can 
review the audio recordings of those hearings and reach the same conclusions as the 
district court.  These are procedural errors; not substantive errors that affect Mejia’s 
rights.  Procedural errors in admitting evidence that do not affect a party’s substantial 
rights must be disregarded.  I.R.C.P. 61.  Similarly, because these claims are 
affirmatively disproved by the record—a defect which is not cured by the presentation of 
additional evidence—the lack of the 20-day notice also would not affect Mejia’s 
substantial rights.  Though the district court erred when it relied on the hearings without 
officially noticing them or having them officially transcribed, and also erred when it failed 
to provide the statutory 20-day notice, these errors are ultimately harmless, and the 
district court’s order dismissing the affirmatively disproved claims should be affirmed.   
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2. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Mejia’s Ineffective Assistance Of 
Counsel Claims On The Basis That Mejia Failed To Present A Prima 
Facie Case On Either Strickland Prong 
 
Mejia also asserted in his June petition that his trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing “to discover or raise issues” and in relation to his Rule 35 motion to reconsider 
following the court’s order relinquishing jurisdiction.  (R., pp.5, 9.)  Where the petitioner 
alleges entitlement to relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show 
that his attorney’s performance was objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by 
that deficiency.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988).  To establish deficient 
performance, the petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s 
performance was adequate and “show that his attorney’s conduct fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.”  Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 154, 177 P.3d 362, 368 
(2008) (citations omitted).  “[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed 
on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation.”  Id.  To establish 
prejudice, the petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that but for his attorney’s 
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.”  Id. 
The district court dismissed Mejia’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on 
the basis that Mejia failed to provide admissible evidence presenting a prima facie case 
under either prong of Strickland, supra.  As noted above, in post-conviction cases, 
unlike other civil complaints, the “application must contain much more than a short and 
plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).”  
Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875, 187 P.3d at 1250 (quoting Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 271, 61 
15 
P.3d at 628).  Applicants are instead required to “specifically set forth the grounds upon 
which [their] application is based.”  Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4903).  “The application must 
present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the 
application will be subject to dismissal.”  Payne, 146 Idaho at 561, 199 P.3d at 136 
(citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Mejia’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to allege any specific 
grounds in regards to deficient performance or prejudice, let alone present facts to 
support his claims.  His claim that his attorney failed to “discover or raise issues” (R., 
p.5) was nebulous—at what stage in the proceedings?  The taking of Mejia’s guilty 
plea?  His conviction?  His sentence?—and the district court correctly dismissed the 
claim.  Mejia’s claim that his attorney was ineffective for failing to respond to the 
dismissal of his Rule 35 motion (R., p.9) at least gives some sort of timeframe for the 
claim, though Mejia still fails to allege either deficient performance or prejudice in 
regards to this claim.  And, as the district court noted, Mejia’s pro se Rule 35 motion 
was dismissed because it was not timely; he could suffer no prejudice from his trial 
attorney’s failure to respond to that dismissal.  (R., pp.67-69.)2 
As noted above, the district court did not give notice of its intent to dismiss these 
claims.  The failure to provide sufficient evidence or specificity to allege a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is a curable defect with the introduction of evidence 
and greater specificity supporting the claims.  Because the defect is potentially curable, 
                                            
2  This claim also fails as a matter of law.  There is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
to pursue a Rule 35 motion.  See United States v. Taylor, 414 F.3d 528, 537 (4th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Paloma, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996).  Because he had no 
constitutional right to counsel, Mejia could not be deprived of his (non-existent) right to 
the effective assistance of counsel even assuming the failure to respond to the 
dismissal of an untimely-filed pro se Rule 35 motion could be considered ineffective. 
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the failure of the district court to give adequate notice of its intent to dismiss the claims 
would generally not be harmless error.  However, in this case, Mejia responded to the 
district court’s order, offering a greater degree of specificity in his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  (R., pp.95-99.)  Though there is no indication that the district 
court considered these filings,3 “[b]ecause this Court employs the same standards on 
appellate review that the trial court applies in considering summary dismissal of a 
petition for post-conviction relief,” if this Court determines that Mejia still failed to present 
sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case in support of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, it can still affirm the dismissal of the claims.  See Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 
227 P.3d at 930. 
Ultimately, Mejia’s claims—even fleshed out—still fail to present a prima facie 
case of ineffective assistance of counsel and are properly dismissed.  Mejia claimed 
that his trial counsel rushed him through his guilty plea advisory form without making 
him aware of the statutes or other plea options.  (R., p.96.)  None of these assertions 
shows ineffective assistance of counsel.  In fact, Mejia’s assertion that he was “rush[ed] 
through” the advisory is directly contradicted by his sworn testimony at his change of 
plea hearing that he had enough time to consider pleading guilty and to review the guilty 
plea advisory form.  (Aug. 2/20/2015 Hrg. at 2:24 – 2:51.)  Moreover, before he 
accepted Mejia’s guilty plea, the district court verified that Mejia was able to understand 
the proceedings; specifically asked if he had any questions about his advisory form; 
ensured that no one had threatened him, or induced him through promises, to plead 
                                            
3  Had the district court considered and ruled upon Mejia’s post-dismissal filings, which 
amounted to a motion for reconsideration, that could have cured its deficient notice.  
State v. Ochieng, 147 Idaho 621, 625, 213 P.3d 406, 410 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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guilty; informed him of the maximum potential sentences he could face; and explained 
the rights he would give up upon pleading guilty.  (Id. at 2:56 – 6:04.)  So advised, Mejia 
waived his rights of his own free will.  (Id. at 6:05 – 6:08.)  Mejia’s guilty plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and any argument that his guilty plea was not valid is 
disproved by the record. 
Next, Mejia asserts that his trial attorney was ineffective for not objecting to the 
judge’s decision.  (R., p.96.)  This claim is still ambiguous and can be dismissed on that 
basis.  Monahan, 145 Idaho at 875, 187 P.3d at 1250; I.C. § 19-4903.  Assuming Mejia 
means the district court’s sentencing decision, this claim is also disproved by the record.  
Mejia’s trial counsel argued for Mejia to be placed on probation.  (Aug. 4/13/2015 Hrg. 
at 7:40 – 11:13.)  Mejia, however, asked the trial court to retain jurisdiction, arguing that 
he would benefit from the rider program.  (Id. at 12:20 – 12:46.)  Contrary to trial 
counsel’s recommendations—but not contrary to Mejia’s—the district court then 
executed Mejia’s sentence and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp.52-54.) 
Mejia claims that his trial counsel failed to inform him of when he would receive 
his presentence investigation report.  (R., pp.96-97.)  This claim fails as a matter of law.  
A trial attorney’s lack of omniscience as to when a PSI will be prepared and delivered is 
not a ground for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In further regards to his PSI, Mejia claims that he did not have enough time to 
review his PSI to identify errors.  (R., p.97.)  He asserts that trial counsel (or perhaps 
the court) violated “I.F.R. Rule 32.1” by failing to disclose the PSI report at least 35 days 
prior to the date of sentencing.  (R., p.97.)  This claim fails as a matter of law.  
Presentence investigation reports are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 32; the state is 
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aware of no “Rule 32.1.”  While the reports are to be disclosed to the defendant “a 
sufficient time prior to the imposition of sentence so as to afford a reasonable 
opportunity” to correct errors, there is no 35-day requirement.  As Mejia acknowledges, 
he had (at least) hours to review and correct his report prior to sentencing (R., p.97), 
which is reasonable.  Mejia also asserts that his trial counsel failed to “object to any of 
the information material provided [in his PSI].”  (Id.)  This claim is affirmatively disproved 
by the record.  Trial counsel did, in fact, inform the district court of corrections that Mejia 
wanted made to his PSI.  (Aug. 4/13/2015 Hrg. at 2:40 – 4:00.)  Moreover, Mejia has 
failed to provide any evidence (or allegation) of additional errors in his PSI.  These 
claims are therefore properly dismissed. 
Mejia asserts that his trial counsel “told the Judge that I had no remorse towards 
my actions” and so made him “look like the bad person.”  (R., p.97.)  This claim is 
affirmatively disproved by the record.  Trial counsel, in fact, told the sentencing judge 
that Mejia felt remorse for his crimes and went on to explain that Mejia felt “ashamed of 
what he’s done; he feels very sorry for what he’s done.”  (Aug. 4/13/2015 Hrg. at 3:48 – 
3:58; 8:03 – 9:10.)  Moreover, as noted above, the sentencing court also gave Mejia the 
opportunity to speak in his own behalf, and he too expressed his remorse.  (Id. at 11:14 
– 13:16.) 
Finally, Mejia asserts that he was not informed by his trial attorney that he would 
have to provide a DNA sample during his rider program intake.  (R., pp.98-99.)  While 
there is no indication whether or not trial counsel so informed Mejia, he cannot show 
prejudice because the record proves that Mejia was informed by the district court at his 
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change of plea hearing that he would be required to give a DNA sample.  (Aug. 
2/20/2015 Hrg. at 5:09 – 5:14.) 
If this Court determines that Mejia’s June petition is entitled to equitable tolling or 
is otherwise timely, and so reaches the merits, this Court should still affirm the district 
court.  Mejia’s claims that the court failed to notify him of the maximum potential 
sentence for his crimes before accepting his guilty plea, or did not permit him to speak 
in his own behalf before sentencing, were properly dismissed because they are 
affirmatively disproved by the record.  The district court also was correct to dismiss 
Mejia’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Mejia failed to provide sufficient 
evidence, or specificity, to make a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in his June petition.  Even after providing additional information and factual assertions to 
flesh out his claims, Mejia still failed to raise a claim on which relief could be granted.  
Although the district court committed procedural errors in dismissing these claims, the 
errors are harmless, and the court should be affirmed.   
 
II. 
Mejia Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied 
His Motion For Appointed Counsel To Pursue His Frivolous Post-Conviction Petitions 
 
A. Introduction 
In connection with his June petition, Mejia filed a motion for court-appointed 
counsel.  (R., pp.29-31.)  The district court denied this motion on the ground that Mejia 
had failed to assert the possibility of a valid claim.  (R., pp.67-68.)  On appeal, Mejia 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when denying his motion for court-
appointed counsel.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.19-22.)  Application of the correct legal 
standards, however, shows no abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed 
by Idaho Code § 19-4904.  “The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed 
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court.”  Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 
P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009).  In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, “[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court’s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  As to questions of law, this Court 
exercises free review.”  Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting 
Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)). 
 
C. The District Court Properly Denied Mejia’s Request For Appointed Counsel 
Because He Failed To Raise The Possibility Of A Valid Claim 
 
There is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings.  
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).  While a district court may, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 19-4904, appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in 
certain circumstances, the court is only required to appoint counsel when a petitioner 
“alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further 
investigation on the defendant’s behalf.”  Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 
P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112.  In determining 
whether the alleged facts justify the appointment of counsel, “every inference must run 
in the petitioner’s favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts.”  Charboneau, 140 Idaho 
at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13.  However, where the claims in the petition are so 
21 
patently frivolous that there is no possibility that they could be developed into a viable 
claim, with or without counsel’s assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel 
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction 
petition.  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 
Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. 
The district court, after articulating and applying the correct legal standards, 
determined that Mejia had failed to show the possibility of a valid claim and so denied 
his motion for court-appointed counsel.  (R., pp.67-68.)  This was a proper exercise of 
the district court’s discretion.  As set forth in Argument I, Mejia’s claims are frivolous:  
The claims from his November petition have no basis in law and are unsupported by 
evidence and are therefore frivolous.  The claims in Mejia’s June petition are untimely 
and are therefore frivolous.  There is no basis for appointing counsel.   
Even if the Court determines that Mejia’s claims from his June petition are either 
entitled to equitable tolling or are timely, and so reaches the merits of those claims, 
Mejia is still not entitled to the appointment of counsel to pursue his post-conviction 
petition.  As shown above, his claims that he was unaware of the maximum possible 
penalties before pleading guilty and that he was not given the opportunity to speak in 
his own behalf before the district court pronounced sentence are affirmatively disproved 
by the record.  These claims are therefore frivolous, are correctly dismissed, and the 
district court properly exercised its discretion when it denied counsel to pursue these 
claims.  Furthermore, as shown above, Mejia’s claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, even considering his post-dismissal filings, are either disproved by the record 
or unsupported by the law and the evidence.   
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Though the state has conceded that the district court erred by dismissing Mejia’s 
June petition without providing the statutorily required 20-day notice, that requirement 
does not apply to an order denying the appointment of counsel.  Even if the district court 
erred by not providing Mejia with the notice before summarily dismissing his June 
petition, Mejia’s claims—in either his June or November petition—are still frivolous.  The 
district court was therefore not required to appoint counsel and properly exercised its 
discretion in denying Mejia’s motion for court-appointed counsel.  Mejia has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for appointed 
counsel.  The district court should therefore be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for the district 
court to consider and rule upon Mejia’s timely-filed November petition. 
The state also requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order dismissing 
Mejia’s June petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that it was untimely.  In the 
alternative, if this Court finds that Mejia’s June petition is entitled to equitable tolling or 
was otherwise timely filed, the state requests that this Court affirm the district court’s 
order on the bases that Mejia’s claims are disproved by the record or unsupported by 
the law and evidence.   
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The state finally requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Mejia’s motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel. 
 DATED this 5th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer___________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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